In an accumulation game, a hider places objects at locations, and a seeker examines these locations. If the seeker discovers an object then he/she confiscates it. The goal of the hider is to accumulate a certain number of objects before a given time, and the goal of the seeker is to prevent this. In this paper we discuss the quiet accumulation game in which the hider is informed of the location searched on a turn only if the seeker finds an object there. We solve the case where the number of steps is 3 and the goal of the hider is to accumulate 2 objects, and the case where the number of steps is equal to the hider's goal.
Definitions and Notation
The type of search game that we analyze models the following types of situations: (1) An illicit organization, such as a terrorist gang, attempts to accumulate a certain minimum amount of material and a law enforcement agency attempts to prevent this by means of a limited number of inspections. (2) A polluter attempts to illegally conceal a quantity of waste, and an enforcement agency tries to uncover this attempt. This leads to a two-person zero sum game between the organization and the law enforcement agency for which the payoff to the organization is 1 (it wins), if it accumulates m units of the material by time K, and is 0 (it loses), otherwise.
In an accumulation game a hider (called H) tries to accumulate a certain number of objects within a certain time by hiding them at a fixed number of locations, and a seeker (called S) attempts to prevent this. In general, H can place the objects at locations 1, 2, . . . , n, and the game is played in discrete time.
The followings are parameters and assumptions. The letter n indicates the total number of locations at which objects can be hidden. I = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of all locations. At each turn H acquires an object and can place it at any empty location. S can examine only one location at each turn. S will find an object with certainty if it is at the location searched.
In this paper we investigate quiet search where H knows the location searched on a turn only if S finds an object there. H can use this information to choose a location in subsequent turns. H has complete knowledge of the empty locations at each turn. H can place an object at a location where : (1) H has not placed an object yet and S has not searched yet, (2) H has not placed an object yet and S has already searched, or (3) H has placed another object but S has already searched and found the object. Note that after S examines an empty location, the location will return to its initial state. This means that H can not distinguish whether or not that location has been examined.
N is the number of objects that H wants to accumulate. The maximum number of steps is k. If H can hide N objects at the end of the t-th turn for some t (N ≤ t ≤ k), the game terminates and H wins (payoff 1) . Otherwise, if H cannot hide N objects within k turns, H loses (payoff 0).
We express this game as (n, N, k) (i.e. a game with n locations, N objects, and k steps). In Section 2 of this paper we analyze the case N = 2 and k = 3. Our results suggest that it is difficult to extend the analysis even to games in the special case where k = N + 1. Some variations of the case k = N + 1 will be analyzed somewhere. We analyze the case where N = k in Section 3. This case is closely related to what we call the very quiet accumulation game (See [5] ).
In [2] , we analyzed noisy search in which H knows the location searched on each turn. We presented the solution for that game for all but some marginal cases. In [3] , we analyzed the noisy case where H can place a continuous material at discrete locations and the game is played in discrete time. We shall usually assume that the game begins in an initial state where H has no objects. However, most of our analysis also applies to situations where the game begins with a number of objects already hidden, but S knows only the number of objects hidden and has no information about their location. The reader can find a general theory of search games in [1] , and information on geometric search games (with notes on open problems) in [4] . Although accumulation games form a new kind of search game, there are many related two-person tactical games including search games. References 1-23 in [2] describe a variety of two-person zero-sum search games. Table 1 in [2] describes some variations on accumulation games.
Quiet Accumulation Game for (n, 2, 3)
Since the total number of turns (the third coordinate) is greater than the number of objects by 1, H will definitely lose if all objects are found within two turns. We define the outcomes as follows.
N : S fails to find an object on the indicated turn. F: S finds an object on the indicated turn.
We often use the following notation to indicate the outcome from H's viewpoint, keeping in mind the information obtained by H.
Fi: On the second step, S finds an object hidden at the ith step, i = 1, 2.
Since the game ends when H succeeds in the first two steps, or when H fails in the first two steps, the following sequences of outcomes can occur.
N N , N FN , FN N , N FF, FN F, FF
H wins in the first three sequences out of six, i.e. , N N , N FN , FN N . A pure strategy for H, denoted ash
are the choices at the second and the third steps, assuming the outcomes of the first step are N and F respectively. Each subscript indicates the step at which the choice is made. Since the game is sequential, we use behavioral strategies rather than mixed strategies. So, at each decision point a player determines a probability distribution on all alternatives.
For S, a behavioral strategy is given bȳ
, where each component is a probability distribution at each decision point. We letq N ≡ (q(·|s 1 
is the probability of H's winning when H and S use behavioral strategiesp andq respectively. 2.1. An optimal strategy for the seeker In this subsection we give the minimax value of the game and a behavioral strategy for S corresponding to the minimax value. The following diagram in Figure 1 is not a game tree, but is helpful for calculating the expected payoff to H when S uses a specified behavioral strategy and H uses a pure strategy. Figure 1 : A diagram for calculating the payoff to the hider.
S's problem is to minimize the probability of H's winning, i.e., to choose a behavioral strategyq so that
is minimized. In the first turn, S cannot distinguish any locations, and so S will choose each location with equal probability under any optimal strategy. This means q(s 1 ) = 1 n for all s 1 ∈ I. So S will find an object with probability 1 n . If S finds an object, S and H will use strategies q F andh F respectively: otherwise, S and H will use strategiesq N andh N respectively. The expected payoff to H is calculated separately as f (h,q) =
. By separating in this way, we see that we can analyze the cases N N and N FN and the case FN N separately. So in the following subsections we give the minimax or maximin strategies of both players separately for the above cases. Note that the argument above applies when we consider H's strategy. So, for example, in subsection 2.1.1, we give a minimax strategy for S in the cases N N and N FN . 
(1)
Assuming (1). (1) and (2) mean that S examines each box except the location which S examined where no object was found. Then calculating the expected payoff to H, case by case, for N N or N FN and any pure strategyh of H, we see that the maximum of the expected payoff is
} (See Part 1 of the Appendix below). 2.1.2. Seeker's strategy in the case FN N Next define S's strategy in the case FN N . Assuming
Then calculating the expected payoff to H, case by case, for FN N and any pure strategyh of H, we see that the maximum of the expected payoff is
(See Part 2 of the Appendix below). Hence if S uses the above strategies, the expected payoff to H is at most
An optimal strategy for the hider
In this subsection we give the maximin value of the game and a behavioral strategy for H corresponding to the maximin value. The next diagram in Figure 2 is not a game tree, but is helpful for calculating the expected payoff of S when H uses a specified behavioral strategy and S uses a pure strategy.
Figure 2 : A diagram for calculating the payoff to the seeker. 
, for h
Then calculating the expected payoff to H, case by case, for N N or N FN and any pure strategys of S, we see that the minimum expected payoff is
}.
Hider's strategy in the case
Then calculating the expected payoff to H, case by case, for FN N and any pure strategȳ s of S, we see that the minimum expected payoff is
(See Part 3 of the Appendix below).
Hence if H uses the above strategies, the expected payoff to H is at least P * H . Consequently we have the following theorem. Interpretations of optimal strategies will be given in Section 4. Theorem 1. The value of the quiet (n, 2, 3) game is P * H . Optimal strategies for both players are given by (1)- (5) with uniform distributions in the first step. Proof: By the analysis in the subsections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 including Parts 1 and 2 in the Appendix, we have
By the analysis in the subsections 2. 
By the basic theory of extensive games (noting that we are treating a game with perfect recall), there are mixed strategiesx andȳ of H and S respectively such that f (x,s) = f (p,s) for all pure strategiess and f (h,ȳ) = f (h,q) and for all pure strategiesh. From these and from (6) and (7), we have
Next supposep andq are behavioral strategies of H and S respectively. There are mixed strategiesx andȳ of H and S respectively such that f (p,q ) = f (x,ȳ ) and f (p ,q) = f (x ,ȳ). From these and (8), we have
Hence (p,q) is an equilibrium point. Hence (1)- (5) are optimal (behavioral) strategies and P * H is the value of the game. Remark. The game tree for (4, 2, 3), i.e., for n = 4 is very complicated, but can be drawn. It shows that the roots of the subgames are at the points reached by the outcome of F in the first turn (By symmetry, there are 4 subgames). Indeed both players know they are at those points when the outcome of the first step is F. We see (3) and (5) are optimal (behavioral) strategies for the subgames, by checking Parts 2 and 3 in Appendix, and by applying the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1. The value of any subgame is
. Since strategies given by (3) and (5) are parts of the whole strategies, we conclude that the pair of optimal (behavioral) strategies in Theorem 1 is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Quiet Accumulation Game for (n, k, k)
In Section 2 we solved the quiet case where N = 2 and k = 3. In this section we solve the case where N = k, i.e., we solve the game for (n, k, k). Since the number of steps is equal to the number of locations, S will win (i.e., payoff 0) as soon as S finds an object at any step. 
There are optimal strategies which are symmetric for both players such that p(
The following identities in the lemmas are elementary but important in solving the game.
On the other hand, for a fixed sequence s 1 , . . . , s k such that s i = s j for all i = j,
Proof of Lemma 1: Without loss of generality, we assume h i = i for i = 1, . . . , k. Then the left hand side becomes:
In the left hand side of the second identity,
So we have the second half.
Proof of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3: By considering the changes of orderings of summations carefully, we have Lemmas 2 and 3.
Proof of Theorem 2: Denote the expected payoff to H by f (p, q) when H and S use the mixed strategies p and q respectively. Denote p * and q * as follows, noting that the payoff is 0 once s i ∈ H i occurs at any step i. 
by Lemmas 2 and 1.
Remark. In the noisy case corresponding to (n, k, k), the game value becomes nPk+1 n k+1 which is derived from Equation (10) of [2] and it is greater than or equal to v(n, k) = (n−k) k nPk . This is reasonable because H has more information in the noisy case than in the quiet case.
We conclude by sketching an alternative derivation of Theorem 2 that applies in any situation in which H loses if even one object is located. We leave the details to the reader. Consider an accumulation game with n locations in which at each turn H hides at h, S searches s, there are k turns and H must retain all objects hidden, N = kh. We assume H does not know the locations where S searches. We shall say that a location is safe at turn i if S will not examine that location at turn i or thereafter. If H places an object at a safe location then it will not be found. A location is called open if there is no object at that location. At turn i the largest number of locations that cannot be safe is (k − i + 1)s. The maximal number is attained if S never searches a location more than once. This is possible if ks < n. Thus the smallest possible number of safe locations on turn i is n − (k − i + 1)s. If H has previously placed objects only at safe locations on previous turns then the number of locations that are free and safe is n − (k − i + 1)s − (i − 1)h. The probability that H places h objects at locations that are safe during turn i is
. The probability that H will win is the product of these numbers as i ranges from 1 to k. If h = s then the probabilities become
If h = s = 1 then the probabilities become n − k n − i + 1 so that the probability of H winning is
Conclusion and Comments
We have formulated a quiet accumulation game and solved two special cases: (1) Where the number of steps is 3 and the number of objects to be hidden is 2, (n, 2, 3); (2) Where the number of steps equals the number of objects to be hidden. In the game for (n, 2, 3) each player should, in principle, choose locations with equal probability if he has the same information on each of those locations. Then, as play proceeds, both players must consider minimax and maximin as in the Appendix. In some cases, optimal strategies for both players are interpreted as follows.
Suppose the outcome of the first step is F. Each player knows the choice of the oppsite player in the first step. Strategies (3) and (5) say that both players should choose strategies as if they were playing the game for (n, 2, 2) in the following two steps. This is because both players must consider that the opposite player may make the same choice as in the first step. They calculate maximin and minimax respectively, and consequently must choose all locations at random.
Suppose the outcome of the first step is N . In the second step, H should choose each location h 2 ( = h 1 ) at random, since he does not know s 1 (The first expression in (4)). S should not choose s 1 since, with probability 1, S would fail to catch an object at h 1 , if S chooses s 1 . So S should choose s 2 ( = s 1 ) at random (The expression (1)).
Suppose the outcomes of the two steps are N and F. S would not be able to distinguish N F1 and N F2. In the third step S should not choose s 1 since, in the case where s 2 = h 2 , and in the case where s 2 = h 1 and s 1 = h 2 , S would fail to catch an object at h 1 , with a probability of 1. Keeping in mind H's strategy, the probability that s 2 = h 1 and s 1 = h 2 occur simultaneously is relatively small. On the other hand S may choose s N 2 in the third step since H may choose it, too (The expression (2)).
For H, the difference between N F1 and N F2 is that there is a possibility that h 2 = s 1 in N F1 and there is no possibility that h 2 = s 1 or s 1 = h 1 in N F2. This difference may affect H's strategy in the third step (The second and third expressions in (4)).
In the game for (n, k, k), H's strategy is clearly understood. In the ith (i ≥ 2) step S should not repeat his previous choices since, with probability of 1, S would fail to catch an object in h 1 , . . . , h i−1 if S chooses one of s 1 , . . . , s i−1 . The reader can easily verify this in the case for (n, 2, 2).
It seems to be difficult to solve the quiet accumulation game in general, i.e., in the case where the number of steps and the goal of H are not specified. On the other hand, it does not appear to be difficult to get a recursive relation of the value function on the number of steps, etc. But the relation will be very complicated, including many state variables. 1 , N , s 2 , F 
To simplify the notation, let We denote by P 1 1 (a, x, y, d) the expected payoff to H : From Figure 3 ,
Case 2: Assume h 31 = h 1 . h 1 , h 2 and h 32 are different. We denote by P 
Case 3: Assume h 32 = h 2 . h 1 , h 2 and h 31 are different. We denote by P 1 3 (a, x, y, d) the expected payoff to H : From Figure 5 ,
Case 4:
Assume h 32 = h 2 and h 31 = h 1 and h 1 = h 2 . 
Figure 7 : Seeker's strategy in FN N : Case 1.
We denote by P 2 1 (b, e) the expected payoff to H : From Figure 7 ,
Case 2: Assume h 3 = h 1 and h 1 = h 2 . We denote by P We denote by P We denote by P We denote by P We denote by P We denote by P 
